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Abstract:  This Article advocates that financial regulators analyze, measure, and take into account the 
emotional  impacts  of their  policies and procedures.  Examples of emotional  impacts are investor 
confidence, process concerns, and  overall market or  social mood.  Investor confidence or  trust in 
securities markets, process concerns about how much securities regulators actually deliberate over 
proposed rules, and financial anxiety or investment stress affect and are affected by financial economic 
variables, such as consumer debt, consumer expenditures, consumer wealth, corporate investment, initial 
public offerings,  and securities market demand,  liquidity, prices,  supply,  and volume.  Cost-benefit 
analysis does not quantitatively consider interdependencies between regulations’ emotional impacts and 
their financial outcomes.  Emotional impact analysis does.  This Article addresses general conceptual and 
measurement issues  about  emotional  impact analysis.  Because f inancial regulations affect investors’ 
confidence, process concerns, and social moods, t his Article  analyzes how financial  regulators  can 
quantitatively analyze emotional impacts of their regulations. 
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Several recent controversies about securities regulations implicate two sets of far-reaching and 
fundamental positive and normative questions, namely 1) what is and should be the way to evaluate 
financial and securities regulatory policies,
1 and 2) what is and should be the appropriate role and scope 
of C ost-Benefit  Analysis  (CBA) in promulgating financial and securities regulations. CBA has been 
defined as “a set of procedures for defining and comparing benefits and costs.  In this sense it is a way of 
organizing and analyzing data as an aid to thinking.”
2  A 1972 Nobel Laureate in economics
3 Kenneth J. 
Arrow
 stated that “some sense of rational balancing of ends and means must be understood to play a 
major role in our understanding of ourselves and our social role.”
4  Most economists advocate regulators 
engage in CBA involving quantitatively estimating monetary costs and benefits.
5  A creative recent 
application of CBA to corporate governance reform examines costs and benefits to increasing diversity of 
corporate boards of directors.
6     
The nontrivial question of whether Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should routinely 
engage in more formal CBA is already the subject of another paper.
7  Thus, this Article brackets that 
question and makes a working hypothesis that such U.S. financial regulators as the SEC can and should 
benefit from utilizing (or in fact inevitably will utilize, at least implicitly) some form of CBA.
8  This is a 
reasonable hypothesis because there are several economic, legal, philosophical, and pragmatic arguments 
                                                 
1 See generally, BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (2005).  
2 RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR. & DWIGHT D. DIVELY, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (1994). 
3 http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1972/index.html. 
4 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS TO ORGANIZATION 15 (1974).  
5 See e.g. Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation, European Corporate Governance 
Institute Working Paper Series in Law No. 21/2004, (Apr. 2004),  available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=536682. 
6 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for 
Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 837-51. 
7 Edward Sherwin, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Why Dollars Don’t Always Make Sense in SEC 
Rulemaking 76-83 (Apr. 27, 2005), available at   
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/projects.php. 
8 Id., at 14-20.  The Securities Regulation Section of the American Association of Law Schools annual m eeting 
chose as its focus: “Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation” (January 4, 2006).  Background materials 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/projects.php. Emotional Impact Analysis 
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in favor of informing policy by some type of CBA.
9  But, this is a hypothesis, which could be false either 
because CBA is too costly or difficult to consistently and successfully implement.  In other words, CBA 
itself might fail a CBA test because its costs may exceed its benefits.  Whether CBA would pass a CBA is 
an open empirical question.
10     
Independent of whether financial regulators can, do, should, or will engage in CBA, this Article 
advocates that financial regulators look beyond CBA to consider emotional impacts of regulations, an 
effort that would entail measuring investors’ confidence and moods in addition to respecting process 
concerns.
11  This Article promotes a different and novel way to evaluate regulations, namely Emotional 
Impact Analysis (EIA).  A formal definition of EIA is analysis that includes evaluation and measurement 
of emotional impacts of policies.  This Article utilizes the phrase “emotional impacts” in a general sense 
to refer to not only emotions, but also affect, feelings, and moods. A widely accepted “circumplex” model 
of affect proposes that emotional concepts can be organized according to a circular structure, in a 
two-dimensional  plane  with the horizontal axis depicting valence ranging from  distress to 
pleasant and the vertical axis indicating the degree of arousal ranging from low to high.
12 So, for 
example, happiness can be high arousal as with elation and excitement, but happiness can also be low 
arousal, as with calmness and serenity.   
Emotional impacts of public policies include not only emotions in their own right, but also effects 
of emotions on economic and f inancial  matters.    For example, rules prohibiting insider trading, 
                                                 
9 See e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Cost-benefit Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221 (1996) (suggesting that CBA can play an important role in helping to inform regulatory 
decision-making if utilized appropriately); JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUITION AND ERROR IN 
PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 189-93 (1998) (explaining the advantages of CBA); and CASS  R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-
BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 25-26 (2002) (“[t]he strongest arguments for CBA seem 
to rest not with neoclassical economics, but with common sense, informed by behavioral economics and cognitive 
psychology”).  But see Amy Sinden,  Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics f or Liberals, 29  COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 191 (2004) (critiquing Sunstein).   
10 See generally WHAT’S ECONOMICS WORTH? VALUING POLICY RESEARCH (Philip G. Pardey & Vincent H. Smith 
eds., 2004). 
11 Douglas Kysar, Preferences for Processes:  The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer 
Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004). Emotional Impact Analysis 
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backdating options issued to executives, or spring loading, the practice of companies granting executives 
stock options just before announcing good news,
13 have not only emotional impacts, including possibly 
investors and the non-investing public feeling greater confidence in stock markets and trust in corporate 
America, but also monetary costs and benefits, including possibly greater stock price informational 
efficiency.  Thus, there are two aspects of emotional impacts.  First, there are changes in affect and 
emotions themselves, which are internal experiences intrinsic to people, in contrast with financial income 
and monetary wealth, which are variables that are or can easily become publicl y or externally observable 
and verifiable to others.  Investors are motivated by not only financial wealth considerations, but also 
such expressive concerns as equality, equity, fairness, justice, patriotism, status, and social 
responsibility.










23   Second, there are changes in 
economic and financial behavior resulting from emotional impacts.  These changes are measurable in 
terms of changes in standard economic and financial variables.  Changes in positive and negative forms of 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 James A. Russell, A Circumplex Model of Affect, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1161 (1980).  See also 
Jonathan Posner et al.,  The  Circumplex Model of A ffect: An Integrative Approach t o Affective Neuroscience, 
Cognitive Development, and Psychopathology, 17 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. 715 (2005). 
13 Kara Scannell et al.,  Can Companies Issue Options, Then Good News?,  WALL ST. J., July 8 -9, 2006, at A1 
(reporting on controversy over spring loading). 
14 Meir Statman, What Do Investors Want?, 30
th Anniversary J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 153, 154-59 (2004). 
15 Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Approaching Awe, A Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic Emotion, 17 COGNITION 
AND EMOTION 297 (2003). 
16 See e.g., Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 520-23 (Francesco Paresi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005). 
17 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough eds., 2004). 
18 See e.g., JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS (2006). 
19 See e.g., Vai-Lam Mui, The Economics of Envy, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 311 (1995). 
20 See e.g., Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2001). 
21 See e.g., Chien-Huang Lin et al., Multiple Reference Points in Investor Regret, J. ECON. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming). 
22  See e.g.,  Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson,  A Psychology of Emotional L egal Decision Making: 
Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)). 
23 See generally J. DOUGLAS  BREMER, DOES  STRESS  DAMAGE THE  BRAIN?: UNDERSTANDING  TRAUMA-RELATED 
DISORDERS FROM A MIND-BODY PERSPECTIVE (2002);  BRUCE MCEWEN, THE END OF STRESS AS WE KNOW IT 
(2002); RICHARD O’CONNOR, UNDOING  PERPETUAL STRESS: THE MISSING  CONNECTION BETWEEN DEPRESSION, 
ANXIETY, AND  21
ST CENTURY ILLNESS  (2005);  HANS  SELYE, THE  STRESS OF LIFE (rev’d ed.  1984); ROBERT M. 
SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON’T GET ULCERS (3d ed. 2004); GENE WALLERSTEIN, MIND, STRESS & EMOTIONS: THE 
NEW SCIENCE OF MOOD (2003); and ALEX J. ZAUTRA, EMOTIONS, STRESS, AND HEALTH (2003). Emotional Impact Analysis 
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affect, emotions, feelings, and mood have both direct consequences in terms of people’s emotional well-
being and indirect consequences for their economic or financial behavior and our economy.   
To illustrate how evaluating financial policy raises issues about CBA and EIA, consider several 
recent controversial securities regulations.  The first example of a contentious recent SEC rule i nvolves 
regulation of mutual funds.  A mutual fund pools money from lots of investors, known as shareholders, to 
purchase diverse assets, such as bonds, money market securities, and stocks.
24  A theoretical rationale for 
mutual funds was provided in 1952 when Harry M. Markowitz  pioneered modern portfolio theory 
(MPT),
25 for which he shared the 1990 Alfred Nobel Prize in Economic Science with Merton H. Miller 
and William F. Sharpe.
26  MPT formalized a long-standing intuition that diversification or “not putting all 
your eggs in one basket” is a reasonable investment strategy to reduce financial risks.
27  Investors today 
face a plethora of retail mutual funds to help them diversify their financial investments.
28  Over half of 
U.S. households  own shares in mutual funds.
29  Americans participate in stock markets primarily via 
mutual funds and pension plans.
30  The U.S. mutual fund industry grew from just 73 funds in 1945 to 
8,000 funds by 2002.
31  Mutual fund shares of 401(k) assets were merely 9% in 1990, but 44% by 2001.
32  
Similarly, 67% of retirement assets were in  equity mutual funds by 2004, compared to 9% in 1990.
33  
                                                 
24 Id., at http://www.mfea.com/GettingStarted/LearningTopics/Basics/TheBasics.asp.  See also E. PHILIP DAVIS  & 
BENN STEIL, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 16-17 (2001) (defining mutual funds). 
25 Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).  See generally HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO 
SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (2d ed. 1991). 
26 http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1990/index.html. 
27 RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 181 (8th 
ed.  2006)  (explaining Harry Markowitz’s pioneering contributions to portfolio diversification); and Burton G. 
Malkiel, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 210-14 
(8th rev. & updtd. ed. 2003) (describing how modern portfolio theory helps investors lower their financial risks).  
28 See e.g., Mutual Fund Investor’s Center, available at http://www.mfea.com/. 
29 Id.  See also Carol C. Bertaut & Martha Starr-McCluer, Household Portfolios in the United States, in HOUSEHOLD 
PORTFOLIOS  183-98 (Luigi Guiso et al. eds., 2002) (providing data, trends, and evidence about U.S. household 
portfolios). 
30 John C. Boogle, Individual Stockholder, R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at A10. 
31 Investment Company Institute, MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK (2003). 
32 Mutual Funds and the U.S. Retirement Market in 2004, 11 FUNDAMENTALS: INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF (2005). 
33 Mutual Funds and the U.S. Retirement Market in 2004, 11 FUNDAMENTALS: INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF (2005). Emotional Impact Analysis 
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U.S. mutual funds managed assets of approximately $50 billion in 1970.
34 American mutual funds now 
hold over more than $7.5  trillion  in assets  and are  continuing to increase significantly in size and 
importance.
35  Mutual funds offer individuals not only investment vehicles, but also advice, education, 
and (mis)information.
36  Recent mutual fund scandals led to a number of class action lawsuits, criminal 
prosecutions, and proposed regulations.
37     
On July 27, 2004, the  SEC adopted  corporate governance  rules that require mutual-fund 
companies to, among other things, (i) have chairs of their boards who are independent of their fund's 
management, and (ii) increase the percentage of directors on their boards who are independent of their 
fund's management from a previously required 50% to 75% (except for three member boards, two are 
required to be independent).
38  On June 21, 2005, the most important court in federal regulatory law, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, unanimously remanded to the SEC for consideration the costs 
of the above two requirements,
39 because “the Commission … “ fail[ed] adequately to consider the 
costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”
40   
Despite this court decision, without providing for any further public notice or comment, and in a 
controversial 3-2 vote, the SEC affirmed its July 2004 rule just eight days later.
41  The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, which originally challenged the SEC rule, also challenged the SEC’s affirming its rule.
42  The 
                                                 
34 Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Competition and Change in the Mutual Fund Industry, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990S 181 (Samuel L. Hayes III ed., 1994). 
35  U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC Mutual Fund "Governance" Litigation (Apr. 8, 2005),  available at  
http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/news/casealerts/ca050408.htm.  See generally R OBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL 
FUND BUSINESS (2d ed. 2002). 
36 Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Investment Advice from Mutual Fund Companies, Fall J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 9 
(1997). 
37 Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 161, 176-81. 
38 Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
39 U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, No. 04-1300 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2005),  available at 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200506/04-1300a.pdf . 
40 Id., at 17. 
41 Michael Schroeder, SEC Adopts Mutual Fund Rule, Risks New Challenge, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at C1.  
This was also just one day before former SEC Chair William Donaldson’s resignation took effect.  Investment 
Company Governance, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390, 39,403 (July 7, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26985fr.pdf.   
42 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Vows to Continue Fight; SEC Mutual Fund Action to be Challenged in Court (June 
29, 2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2005/june/05-112.htm ; Chamber Files Motion to 
Stay SEC Mutual Fund Rule (July 26, 2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2005/july/05-Emotional Impact Analysis 
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SEC estimated the costs of compliance per mutual fund would be “extremely small relative to the fund 
assets for which fund boards are responsible, and are also small relative to the expected benefits.”
43  Both 
of the dissenting Commissioners, eight Senators, former SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest, and 
former SEC Chair Harvey Pitt all made pleas for a more deliberative approach.
44   
On April 7, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously vacated both 
requirements,
45  holding that the SEC violated the comment requirement of section 553(c) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act,  because the  SEC  “relied on extra-record material critical to its costs 
estimates without affording an opportunity for comment to the prejudice of the Chamber.”
46  The court, 
however, suspended issuance of its mandate for 90 days, giving the SEC an opportunity to “reopen the 
record for comment on the costs of implementing the two conditions.”
47  On June 13, 2006, the SEC 
issued a request for additional comments until August 21, 2006 regarding these rules.
48  One can view 
these comments on-line.
49   
One securities law scholar believes that new mutual fund regulation is likely to have unknowable 
costs, but few knowable benefits.
50  A recent empirical study  finds that strengthened corporate 
governance controls have no statistically significant impact on mutual fund outflows.
51  Three additional 
recent empirical studies find that when directors and managers of mutual funds personally own shares in 
                                                                                                                                                 
126.htm ; and U.S. Chamber Files Suit Against New Mutual Fund Rules; Charges SEC Overstepped Authority in 
Independent Boards (Sept. 2, 2005),  available at  http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2004/september/04-
118.htm . 
43 Investment Company Governance, supra note 41, at 39,395. 
44  Id., at 39,408.  See also  http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/glassman062905.pdf; 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/atkins062905.pdf;  http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/icgletters/senate062205.pdf; 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/icgletters/jagrundfest062305.pdf; and 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/icgletters/hpitt062305.pdf. 
45 U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, No. 05-1240 (D.C. Cir. April 7, 2006),  available at 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200604/05-1240a.pdf. 
46 Id., at 31. 
47 Id., at 33. 
48 SEC Release No. IC-27395, File No. S7-03-04,  available at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/ic-
27395.pdf.   
49 http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304.shtml. 
50 Larry E. Ribstein, Do the Mutuals Need More Law?, Spring REG. 4, 5 (2004). 
51 Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals 25-27 (Jan. 1, 2006). New York 
University Law  School Law  and Economics Working Paper 43,  available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/43/.    Emotional Impact Analysis 
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those mutual funds, those mutual funds perform better.
52  These findings provide support for SEC rules 
that require mutual funds to disclose information regarding mutual fund share ownership by directors,
53 
and respectively managers.
54     
Although this particular controversy focuses on regulating mutual fund governance, a number of 
other recent controversies also involve the proper boundaries of SEC regulation.  One controversy arose 
in response to the SEC’s p roposal to impose a mandatory  two percent redemption fee on mutual fund 
shareholders who redeem shares within five days of their purchase.
55   A second controversy was the 
SEC’s proposal to amend Rule 22c-1 by adopting a hard 4 p.m. close for mutual fund orders.
56  A third 
controversy  involved  an SEC rule that required  members of the hedge fund industry to register as 
investment advisors.
57  Susan Ferris Wyderko, the SEC’s director of investor education, testified that the 
hedge fund industry invests $1.2 trillion in assets.
58  On June 24, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit unanimously held that the SEC lacks the authority to regulate hedge funds.
59  The SEC’s 
chair responded by stating that the “ court's finding, that despite the Commission's investor protection 
objective its rule is arbitrary and in violation of law, requires that going forward we reevaluate the 
                                                 
52 Martijn Cremers et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund 
Industry (Mar. 2005),  available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686167; Allison L. Evans, 
Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Performance (Jan. 15, 2006), a vailable at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893802; and Alex Khorana et al., Portfolio Manager Ownership 
and Fund Performance (Mar. 23, 2006),  available at 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/FACSEMINARS/events/finance/Papers/ownperffunds.pdf. 
53 Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Release Nos. 33-7932; 34-43786; IC-24816; File No. 
S7-23-99, (Jan. 3, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-43786.htm. 
54 Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment Companies, Release Nos. 33-
8458; 34-50227; IC-26533; File No. S7-12-04,  (Aug. 23, 2004),  available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8458.htm . 
55  SEC Proposes Mandatory Redemption Fees for Mutual Fund Securities (Feb. 25, 2004),  available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-23.htm . 
56 Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Release No. IC-26288; File No. S7-27-03 (Dec. 
11, 2004); Proposed Rule: 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (Dec. 17, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ic-26288.htm .  See also Deborah Solomon,  New SEC Chief Plans to Enforce 
Hedge-Fund Rule, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at A1. 
57 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279, SEC Release 
No. IA-2333, File No. S7-30-04, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm .  See also Implications of 
the Growth of Hedge Funds, Report of the Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 2, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
58 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Double Trouble Valuing the Hedge-Fund Industry, WALL ST. J., July 8-9, 2006, at B3 
(reporting on confusion over the size of the hedge fund industry). Emotional Impact Analysis 
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agency's approach to hedge fund activity.”
60  Legal academics disagree over how much to regulate hedge 
funds.
61       
Finally, there has been great controversy over Congressional passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX),
62 in particular,  the  internal  financial control provisions of Section 404.  Four legal 
scholars discuss and summarize recent evidence from a number of empirical  studies o f SOX utilizing 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA),
63 estimating that SOX is likely to have modest benefits which are hard to 
document, but measurable compliance costs which are already very large.
64  Other corporate law scholars 
have different views towards SOX.
65  Experimental research provides insights about how trust affects 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 Phillip Goldstein, et al. v. SEC  No. 04-1434 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2006),  available at 
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200606/04-1434a.pdf. 
60 Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Phillip Goldstein, et al. v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, June 23, 2006,  available at  http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-
101.htm . 
61 Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 71 (June 2006), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913045 (arguing that extensive direct regulation of hedge funds is unnecessary and could 
harm our trading markets); Robert C. Pozen, Hedge Funds Today: To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, 
at A14 (discussing some concerns about hedge funds); and David Skeel, Behind the Hedge,  LEGAL  AFFAIRS, 
Nov./Dec. 2005 at 28 (providing examples of bad hedge fund behavior). 
62 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).   
63 Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale 
for Policymakers Too, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business & Program on 
Corporate Governance Discussion  Paper No. 525 (Sept. 2005),  available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/Clark-Corp%20Gov_9.20.05.pdf; 
Donald C. Langevoort,  Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as 
Responsibility for Systems”, 31 J. CORP. L. ? (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Market versus Regulatory Responses to 
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) and Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).  See also Larry 
E. Ribstein,  Bubble Laws, 40  HOUS.  L.  REV. 77, 83-90 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein,  International Implications of 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on US Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 299 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road 
to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279; and Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley after Three Years, NEW ZEALAND 
L.  REV.  (2005), Illinois Law and Economics Working Paper No. LE05-016 (June 20, 2005),  available at 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=746884. 
64 HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO 
FIX IT (2006). 
65  See e.g.,  Robert B. Ahdieh,  From ‘Federalization’ to ‘Mixed Governance’ in Corporate Law: A Defense of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 B UFF. L. R EV. L. R EV 721 (2005);  William W. Bratton,  Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Accounting: Rules Versus Standards Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. R EV. 1023 (2003) (finding SOX begins a political 
process intended over time to produce a new regulatory regime); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Might Just Work), 36 U. CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (reading SOX as 
being a modest Act); Brett McDonnell,  Sarbanes-Oxley, Fiduciary Duties, and the Conduct of Officers and 
Directors, E UR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming) (concluding that although SOX imposes significant compliance 
costs, it also results in beneficial changes in the behaviors of accountants, directors, and officers); and Brett 
McDonnell, SOx Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 505 (explaining how SOX induced regulators and private 
actors better informed than Congress to undertake a new reform dynamic spurring desirable changes in the corporate 




66 and how to prevent fraud  in laboratory  settings.
67  The Social Science Research 
Network posted in 2004 alone nearly 200 working papers about corporate governance.
68  Finally, two 
economists very recently proposed formal theoretical models drawing upon contract theory to analytically 
evaluate corporate governance reforms.
69     
Much of the controversy over the aforementioned mutual fund governance rules involved process 
concerns over whether the SEC had genuinely deliberated before affirming its mutual fund governance 
rules upon the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision to  remand them to the SEC for 
consideration of those rules’ costs.   As the distinguished economist Albert O. Hirschman eloquently 
stated, “for a democracy to function well and to endure, it is essential, so it has been argued, that opinions 
not be fully formed in advance of the process of deliberation.
70  Not only substantive outcomes, but also 
process considerations motivate people’s behavior, even when it comes to investment and retirement 
savings.
71  Recently, two economists proposed a notion of procedural utility and provided empirical 
evidence that participation rights lead to procedural utility in terms of a feeling of self-determination and 
influence; while actual participation and use of participation rights did not.
72  Two psychologists 
conducted  experiments on the World Wide Web  and found  that  CBA can increase people’s trust in 
                                                 
66 Amy K. Chow & Ronald R. King, An Experimental Investigation of Trust and Justice: Implications for Corporate 
Governance, (Feb. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892332. 
67 Michael Daniel Guttentag et al., Sarbanes-Oxley in the Laboratory: Using Experimental Economics to Study 
Fraud Prevention, presentation at the American Association of Law and Economics (May 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.amlecon.org/2006_program.pdf. 
68 Dennis Wright Michaud & Kate A. Magaram, Recent Technical Papers on Corporate Governance, Brown 
University Corporate Governance Program Working Paper (Apr. 6, 2006),  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=895520. 
69 Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, A Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance Reform (Feb. 
6, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=881581. 
70 Albert O. Hirschman, Having Opinions – One of the Elements of Well-Being?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 75, 77 (1989). 
71 Tom R. Tyler, Process Utility and Help Seeking: What Do People Want from Experts?, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
360, 362-72 (2006) (demonstrating empirically that people’ utilities extend beyond financial and material outcomes 
to process, even in settings traditionally framed in economic terms); and Harris Sondak & Tom R. Taylor,  How 
Does Procedural Justice Shape the Desirability of Markets?, J. ECON. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming)  
72 Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer, Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility, 57 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 90 
(2005).  See also Bruno Frey et al., Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, But Also How Matters, 160 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 377 (2004); Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz,  Being Independent Raises 
Happiness at Work, 11  SWEDISH  ECON.  POL’Y  REV.  95 (2004); and Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Making 
International Organizations More Democratic, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 305 (2005).   Emotional Impact Analysis 
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decisions that government agencies or companies make.
73  Empirical research based upon data from the 
European Union revealed that institutional trust in law positively impacts people’s subjective well-
being.
74  Thus, EIA should analyze and acknowledge not only emotions rel ated to substantive outcomes, 
but also such emotions related to procedural or process considerations  as emotional difficulties that 
individuals and groups of people have in facing and making certain types of tradeoffs.
75                 
This Article  advocates that  securities and  financial regulators can and must incorporate 
consequences that securities and financial regulations have upon the affect, emotions, feelings, and moods 
of investors, other financial markets participants, and even people who are not participants in financial or 
securities  markets.
76   EIA  advocates  that  regulators  consider  emotional  impacts that alternative 
regulations  have upon  both emotions themselves and consequences of emotions on  economic and 
financial variables. Such analysis is more challenging than traditional CBA but researchers in psychology 
and neurosciences have successfully analyzed, measured, and studied changes in emotions.  Ex ante CBA 
of environmental, health, and safety regulations is based upon monetary measures of benefits and costs,
77 
determined via  revealed preference techniques,  such as hedonic pricing methodology,
78  or  stated 
preference techniques, such as contingent valuation methodology.
79  EIA shares its emphasis on actual 
                                                 
73 Jonathan Baron & Andrea D. Gurmankin Levy, Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Increase Trust in Decision Makers, 
available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron/cba.html.  
74 John Hudson, Institutional Trust and Subjective Well-Being across the EU, 59 KYKLOS 43 (2006). 
75 See generally  MARY LUCE FRANCES ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS:  TRADEOFF DIFFICULTY AND COPING IN 
CONSUMER CHOICE (2001). 
76 See e.g., Patric Andersson & Richard Tour, How to Sample Behavior and Emotions: A Psychological Approach 
and an Empirical Example, 26 IRISH J. MGMT. 92 (2005) (describing an experience sampling method pilot study of 
day-traders); and Andrew W. Lo et al., Fear and Greed in Financial Markets: A Clinical Study of Day-Traders, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 352 (2005) (finding a correlation between more intense emotional reactions to monetary gains or 
losses and significantly worse performance among day-traders).  See generally J OCELYN PIXLEY, EMOTIONS IN 
FINANCE: DISTRUST AND UNCERTAINTY IN GLOBAL MARKETS (2004). 
77  ANTHONY  E.  BOARDMAN ET AL.,  COST-BENEFIT  ANALYSIS:  CONCEPTS AND  PRACTICE 3 (3d ed. 2006) 
(differentiating between ex ante CBA and ex post CBA). 
78 See generally Daniel McFadden, The New Science of Pleasure: Consumer Behavior and the Measurement of 
Well-Being, Frisch Lecture, Econometric Society World Congress, London (Aug. 20, 2005) (revised Oct. 5, 2005), 
available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/dromer/e237_f05/mcfadden.pdf.  See e.g., PATRICK BAYER ET 
AL., MIGRATION AND HEDONIC VALUATION: THE CASE OF AIR  QUALITY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING 
PAPER  NO.  12106,  available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12106 (critiquing standard hedonic techniques for 
estimating value of local amenities because those methods assume that households move freely among locations). 
79 See e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 FED. REG. 4601 (1993); 
and Dollar-Based Ecosystem Valuation Methods: Contingent Valuation Method,  available at 
http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/contingent_valuation.htm. Emotional Impact Analysis 
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impacts, as opposed to inferred tastes or hypothetical preferences, with a recent proposal by psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman and economist Robert Sugden  to  evaluate environmental policy based upon 
experienced utility  measures.
80   Finally,  EIA  is  related to psychologist Gerald Clore’s  proposal  for 
emotional accounting.
81   
EIA  incorporates psychological insights about emotional  impacts including process concerns.  
EIA is a stand-alone type of analysis that differs from CBA because EIA focuses on emotional impacts 
instead of costs and benefits.  Although emotional impacts can be categorized as costs and benefits, most 
CBA does not consider emotional impacts.  In addition, CBA measures costs and benefits in monetary 
terms, while EIA does not require that emotional impacts be monetized.   Of course, s ecurities and 
financial regulators can perform both CBA and EIA, neither, or just one form of analysis.  This Article 
utilizes the specific example of U.S. federal securities regulation as a template for analyzing how and why 
financial regulators can and should perform EIA more generally.   
The rest of this Article is organized as follows.  Section I analyzes EIA in financial regulation, 
advocating that U.S. financial regulators should engage routinely in  EIA.  Section  I also examines the 
current practice of CBA in SEC rulemaking, finding that it leaves much to be desired.  Section II analyzes 
conceptual and measurement issues that arise in  EIA.  A conclusion summarizes this Article and 
speculates on generalizing EIA to non-financial social policies. 
I.  Emotional Impact Analysis in Financial Regulation 
Independent of whether a financial regulator engages in CBA, this Article advocates that it should 
engage in EIA.  This Article theoretically evaluates potential conceptual problems and measurement 
difficulties of EIA, both in general and in the specific contexts of securities regulation and financial 
regulation.  U.S. financial regulators generally conduct some form of CBA in promulgating rules.  A 
                                                 
80 Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden,  Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32  ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005). 
81 Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1151, 
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number of legal scholars argue for and endorse CBA in financial regulation.
82  But, a number of legal 
scholars  are very critical of CBA in non-financial regulations.
83  Furthermore,  even  for a particular 
financial regulation other considerations can trump CBA.  For example, one may feel that insider trading 
or securities fraud should be illegal even if they lead to financial benefits, such as equilibrium securities 
market prices conveying insider information,  exceeding their  financial  costs, because they lead to 
emotional impacts, such as some individual retail investors feeling that securities markets are not a level 
playing field and therefore not participating in securities markets.   
Some people feel similarly about how Ford Motor Company used CBA in deciding to not correct 
a serious defect in their design and placement of gas tanks in the Pinto.
84  An economist discusses two 
satirical examples of CBA from literature,
85 one involving eating infants,
86 and another about paying for a 
public suicide.
87 Another non-financial example of CBA that most people are likely to find troubling  is 
utilizing CBA to decide whether to assassinate or torture a known or even suspected terrorist.  Indeed, 
people and societies often choose to not utilize CBA for categories of decisions by adopting decision 
rules.
88  But, even for regulations that are desirable regardless of quantifiable benefits, regulators can 
analyze costs and choose to adopt regulations that are most cost-effective.  Non-financial regulators can 
apply cost-effectiveness analysis to ration health care
89 and to combat global warming.
90       
                                                 
82 Langevoort, supra note 63; Ribstein, supra note 63; and Romano, supra note 63. 
83 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND 
THE  VALUE OF  NOTHING  35-40  (2004);  Edwin C. Baker, Starting Points in the Economic Analysis of Law, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 939 (1980); and Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J.  LEGAL 
STUD. 971 (2000). 
84 See e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, in THE FORD PINTO CASE: A STUDY IN 
APPLIED ETHICS, BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY 123-36 (Douglas Birsch & John H. Fielder eds., 1994); HAROLD 
WINTER,  TRADE-OFFS:  AN  INTRODUCTION TO  ECONOMIC  REASONING AND  SOCIAL  ISSUES  10-14  (2005)  and 
http://www.engineering.com/content/ContentDisplay?contentId=41009014. 
85  THE  LITERARY BOOK OF  ECONOMICS:  INCLUDING  READINGS FROM  LITERATURE AND  DRAMA O N  ECONOMIC 
CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND THEMES 301-05 (Michael Watts ed., 2003). 
86 JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1729). 
87 PAR LAGERKVIST, A Hero’s Death, in THE MARRIAGE FEAST 37-38 (1954). 
88 See e.g., On Amir & Dan Ariely, Decisions by Rules: The Case of Unwillingness to Pay for Beneficial Delays, 
(Jan. 2006),  available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=876108; Jonathan Baron, 
Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 B EHAV.  &  BRAIN  SCI. 1 (1994); Drazen Prelec & Richard Herrnstein, 
Preferences or Principles: Alternative Guidelines for Choice,  in  STRATEGY A ND  CHOICE  319-40  (Richard J. 
Zeckhauser ed., 1991); and Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 (2004). 
89 See generally PETER UBEL, PRICING LIFE: WHY IT'S TIME FOR HEALTH CARE RATIONING (1999). Emotional Impact Analysis 
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Two critics of CBA state “[i]n practice, most cost-benefit analyses could more accurately be 
described as “complete cost-incomplete benefit” studies.  Most or all of the costs are readily determined 
market prices, but many important benefits cannot be meaningfully quantified or priced, and are therefore 
implicitly given a value of zero.”
91  A reason CBA is often incomplete about benefits, while complete 
about costs, is that many costs are monetary and easy to measure, while those benefits that are left out 
include process concerns and  emotional impacts, which are perceived to be difficult for  people to 
quantify.
92  EIA explicitly recognizes emotional impacts and places non-zero values upon them. 
It might seem that of all types of regulation, financial regulation and securities regulation are two 
areas in which regulators do not have to analyze emotional considerations because there already exist 
natural metrics and yardsticks for e valuating outcomes, namely  aggregate  levels of financial and 
economic variables, such as consumption, investment, liquidity, prices, trading volume, and wealth.  In 
addition, many people believe that equilibrium prices of competitive stock markets already  reflect all 
relevant fundamental information for accurately pricing stocks and only that information.
93  But, there is 
much empirical data that investor confidence and social mood alters levels of such traditional economic 
and financial variables as corporate finance,
94 including corporate investment, initial public offerings,
95 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 208 (2005). 
91 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 83, at 40. 
92 JOEL BEST, MORE DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS: HOW NUMBERS CONFUSE PUBLIC ISSUES 9-13 (2004). 
93 See e.g., BREALEY, MYERS, & ALLEN, supra note 27, at 333-37.   
94 See generally HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE: DECISIONS THAT CREATE VALUE (2007). 
95 See e.g., Lucy F. Ackert, et al, Emotion and Financial Markets, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 
33 (2003); Kevin Au et al., Mood in Foreign Exchange Trading: Cognitive Processes and Performance, 91 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 322 (2003); Glenn W. Boyle et al., Emotion, Fear and Superstition in the 
New Zealand Stockmarket, (Feb. 18, 2003)  (analyzing New Zealand stock market reaction to five economically-
neutral events that psychological research indicates have varying degrees of influence on people’s emotions and 
moods), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=388581; Michael Dowling & Brian Lucey, 
The Role of Feelings in Investor Decision-Making 90 J. ECON. SURVEYS 211 (2005); David Dreman, The Influence 
of Affect on Investor Decision-Making, 5 J. BEHAV. FIN. 70 (2004); Frank Fehle et al., Can Companies Influence 
Investor Behaviour through Advertising?  Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 625 
(2005) (finding significant abnormal stock returns for companies which advertise and consistent with mood and 
attention effects);Melissa L. Finucane, Mad Cows, Mad Corn, & Mad Money: Applying What We Know About the 
Perceived Risk of Technologies to the Perceived Risk of Securities, 3  J.  PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS  15 (2002); 
Baruch Fischoff et al,  Investing in Frankenfirms: Predicting Socially Unacceptable Risks, 2 J. PSYCHOL. &  FIN. 
MARKETS 100 (2001); Donald G. MacGregor, et al, Imagery, Affect, and Financial Judgment, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. 
MARKETS 104 (2000); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment,  60 J. 
FIN.  2661  (2005) (finding that overconfident CEOs engage in excessive corporate  investment when they have 
abundant internal funds, but limit corporate investment when they require external financing); Ulrike Malmendier & Emotional Impact Analysis 
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and mergers and acquisitions, individual debt, market liquidity, and securities demand.  In other words, 
“[s]tock market prices reflect both (fundamental) value and sentiment.”
96  Seventy years ago, a famous 
macroeconomist John Maynard Keynes utilized the phrase “animal spirits” to describe investor optimism 
or pessimism when he stated that:  
Even apart from the instability due to speculation,  there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on 
spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral or 
hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the 
full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken 
as the result of animal spirits - a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not 




Noted economist John Kenneth Galbraith believed there is not much that securities regulators can 
do about financial euphoria.
98  In contrast, several legal scholars have proposed that securities regulators 
can and should regulate financial market euphoria.
99 
Recent evidence suggests that relationships between emotional considerations and financial 
economic variables not only exist, but also run surprisingly in both directions.  There is a growing body 
of intriguing empirical data demonstrating that local astronomical and meteorological conditions are 
correlated with market index returns on international financial exchanges.
100  There is medical and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Geoffrey Tate, Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited, 11 
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Bias, and Volatility of Equity Prices, 26 J.  ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 869 (2002); John R. Nofsinger, Social 
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(2002)  (finding that for eight international stock markets, returns are statistically significantly and negatively 
correlated with temperature); Melanie Cao & Jason Wei,  An Expanded Study of the Stock Market Temperature 
Anomaly 22  RES. IN  FIN.  73 (2005) (expanding on and confirming their previous research to include nineteen 
additional financial markets); Ilia D.  Dichev & Troy D. Janes, Lunar Cycle Effects in Stock Returns, J. PRIVATE Emotional Impact Analysis 
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psychological evidence that weather affects people’s moods and behavior.
101  There is also fiel d evidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
EQUITY, Fall 2003 (finding that returns are significantly higher, on the magnitude of 5% to 8% on an annualized 
basis, around new moon dates as compared to full moon dates for all major U.S. stock indices over their entire 
available history); Michael Dowling & Brian M. Lucey, Weather, Biorhythms and Stock Returns: Some Preliminary 
Irish Evidence, 14 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 337 (2005) (examining relationship between eight proxy variables for 
investor mood, based on weather, biorhythms, and beliefs, and daily Irish stock returns from  1988 to 2001 and 
finding that some variables proposed in recent literature, rain and time changes around daylight savings have, minor 
but significant influences); William N. Goetzmann and Ning Zhu, Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect?, 11 
EUR.  FIN.  MGMT. 559  (2005) (finding and interpreting  evidence that  behavior of market makers, rather than 
individual investors, may be responsible for observed relationship between stock market returns and weather); David 
A. Hirshleifer & Tyler G. Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather, 58 J. FIN. 1009 (2003) 
(finding that morning sunshine at a country's leading stock exchange is strongly, positively correlated with stock 
market index returns that day at twenty six stock exchanges internationally from 1982-97); Mark Jack Kamstra et 
al., Losing Sleep at the Market: The Daylight Savings Anomaly, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2000) (showing that  so-
called weekend effect in  terms of lower-than-expected Friday-to-Monday stock market  returns is particularly 
pronounced for two weekends involving daylight-savings clock changes); Mark Jack Kamstra et al., Losing Sleep at 
the Market: The Daylight Savings Anomaly: Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1257 (2002) (revisiting issue of whether 
daylight-saving-time changes impact financial markets and conclude that evidence indicates they do); Mark Jack 
Kamstra et al.,  Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle, 93 AM. ECON.  REV. 324 (2003); Anna Krivelyova & 
Cesare Robotti, Playing the Field: Geomagnetic Storms and International Stock Markets, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
ATLANTA  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  2003-5b (2003) (finding empirical evidence that unusually high levels of 
geomagnetic storm activity have a statistically and economically significant negative impact on next week’s returns 
for all U.S. stock market indices), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=375702; Piman 
Limpaphayom et al., Gloom and Doom? Local Weather and Futures Trading (2005) (providing direct evidence that 
local weather affects investor behavior by finding that effective bid-ask spreads increase on windy days and that sky 
cover and wind are positively related to futures floor traders’ incomes and market timing abilities), available at 
http://www.asianfa.com/SPTOP/810/AP/810_AP007.pdf; Edward M. Saunders, Jr.,  Losing Stock Prices and Wall 
Street Weather, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1993) (providing first study to empirically examine relationship between 
amount of sunshine and stock market returns, finding that less cloud cover in New York  City is associated with 
increased returns for major stock market indices of exchanges based in New York City); and Kathy Yuan et al., Are 
Investors Moonstruck? Lunar Phases and Stock Returns 13 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 1 (2006) (providing evidence for a 
global sample of forty-eight countries that stock returns are lower by 3% to 5% per annum on days around a full 
moon than on days around a new moon).  But see Walter Kramer & R alf Runde,  Stocks and the Weather: An 
Exercise in Data Mining or yet Another Capital Market Anomaly, 22 EMPIRICAL ECON. 637 (1997) (attempting to 
replicate findings that stock prices are systematically affected by local weather utilizing German data, and finding 
that no systematic relationship seems to exist);  Reinhold P. Lamb et al., Don't Lose Sleep on It: A Re-Examination 
of the Daylight Savings Time Anomaly, 14 APPLIED  FIN. ECON. 443 (2004) (finding that neither consistency nor 
magnitude and statistical significance of a daylight savings stock market anomaly survives serious scrutiny); Tim 
Loughran & Paul Schultz,  Weather, Stock Returns, and the Impact of Localized Trading Behavior, 39 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 343, 345, 355-62 (2004) (finding little evidence that cloudy weather in a company’s 
headquarters affects its stock returns); Angel Pardo &  Enric Valor, Spanish Stock Returns - Rational or Weather 
Influenced? 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 117 (2003) (finding no evidence indicating that sunshine hours and humidity levels 
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ENGINEERING 117 (2003) (finding that cloudy days neither cause nor are related to the Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 
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101 See e.g., Matthew C. Keller et al., A Warm Heart and A Clear Head: The Contingent Effects of Weather on Mood 
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that weather affects reviewers’ judgments and decisions about college applicants.
102  Conversely, it is 
intuitive that financial economic variables impact people’s affect, emotions, moods, and subjective well-
being.
103  For example, empirical research finds that consumer personal debt can be very stressful.  One 
study  finds that heads of households with greater outstanding non-mortgage credit debt balances are 
significantly more likely to report higher levels of psychological distress.
104  Another study finds that 
credit card behavior is associated with scores on the Frontal Lobe Personality Scale, which is a measure 
of personality and behavioral traits associated with frontal cortex dysfunction.
105  Finally psychological 
research finds that while materia listic financial  attitudes can have negative emotional consequences,
106 
non-materialistic financial attitudes correlate positively with financial knowledge and subjective well-
being.
107  Such emotions as stress also affect and are affected by our social relationships.
108 In addition, 
there is evidence that negative emotions hurt our longevity, mental health, mortality, and physical 
health,
109 while positive emotions improve them.
110   
                                                                                                                                                 
pressure is related to higher mood, better memory, and broadened cognitive style during spring as time spent outside 
increased).  
102 Uri Simonsohn., Clouds Make Nerds Look Good: Field Evidence of the Impact of Incidental Factors on Decision 
Making, Aug. 2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906872 (analyzing a data set of actual college admission 
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104 Sarah Brown et al., Debt and Distress: Evaluating the Psychological Costs of Credit, 26 ECON. PSYCHOL. 642 
(2005). 
105 Marcello Spinella et al.,  Predicting Credit Card Behavior: A Study in Neuroeconomics, 100  PERPETUAL & 
MOTOR SKILLS 777 (2005). 
106 Carol Nickerson et al.,  Zeroing in on the Dark Side of the American Dream: A Closer Look at the Negative 
Consequences of the Goal for Financial Success, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 531 (2003); Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, A 
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In light of these pervasive links between emotions and financial decisions, it becomes clear that 
investor confidence in securities markets and trust in corporate America having a culture of honesty are 
important public goods.
111  There is a voluminous behavioral finance literature about investor 
sentiment.
112  Corporate and securities law scholar Lynn Stout suggests that investor confidence and trust 
motivate investing.
113  A number of legal scholars have addressed how to restore trust in American 
business.
114  Recent experimental evidence finds that trust harmed by untrustworthy actions can be 
restored effectively, but trust harmed by the same untrustworthy behavior and deception never fully 
recovers.
115  Financial economists and the popular press have proposed numerous measures of investor 
confidence, mood, or sentiment, some based upon survey data, and others based upon financial market 
statistics, such as Barron’s Confidence Index,
116 the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index or 
Investor Fear Gauge,
117 the Equity Market Sentiment Index,
118 Issuance Percentage,
119 Net Cash Flow into 
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112  See generally H ERSH  SHEFRIN,  A  BEHAVIORAL  APPROACH TO  ASSET  PRICING  201-19  (2005).  See also 
http://sentiment.behaviouralfinance.net/. 
113 Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407 (2002). 
114 See generally RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (Jay W. Lorsch et al. eds., 2005); RESTORING TRUST IN 
AMERICA’S BUSINESS INSTITUTIONS: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, NOV. 6-
7, 2003 (Margaret M. Blair & William W. Bratton eds., 2005); and ROBERT C. SOLOMON & FERNANDO FLORES, 
BUILDING TRUST IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND LIFE (2001). 
115 Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Promises and Lies: Restoring Violated Trust, ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION 
PROCESSES  (forthcoming), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1321.pdf. 
116 Malek Lashgari, The Role of TED Spread and Confidence Index in Explaining the Behavior of Stock Prices, 18 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 9 (2000). 
117 George J. Jiang, & Yisong S. Tian, Gauging the 'Investor Fear Gauge': Implementation Problems in the CBOE's 




120 the Put-Call Ratio,
121 and the Risk Appetite Index.
122  A recent empirical study finds that 
a simple measure of media pessimism constructed from the Wall Street Journal’s daily “Abreast of the 
Market” column predicts low stock market prices.
123  EIA of investor sentiment must differentiate 
amongst different categories of investors, however, because investor sentiment differs across investors.
124    
Although how to accurately and most usefully measure the mood and sentiment of consumers and 
investors remain open questions,
125 there are several measures of consumer and investor confidence and 
optimism including the ABC News/Money Magazine Consumer Comfort Index;
126 UBS/Gallup Index of 
Investor  Optimism;
127 the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index;
128 and  the University of 
Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center Index of Investor Sentiment, Investor 
Current Conditions Index, Index of Investor Expectations,  Index of Consumer Sentiment,  Index of 
Consumer Confidence, and Index of Consumer Expectations.
129  A number of studies  investigate the 
relationship between various measures of consumer confidence or investor sentiment and real economic 
variables or  stock market performance.
130  Thus, although emotional  variables are more difficult to 
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measure and quantify than traditional financial economic variables, it has been done in various ways, 
making EIA quite feasible.      
II.  How Cost-Benefit Analysis and Emotional Impact Analysis Differ 
CBA strives to be, often appears to be, and usually is a cold and unemotional, technocratic 
method of (assisting) human decision-making.  Quantification has a seductive allure suggesting at once 
clarity and simplicity, providing individuals and societies hard raw data for deliberation over and 
justification of decisions.
131  CBA, like other forms of commensuration,
132 such as rankings of academic 
institutions,  employers, places to live,  websites, and wines, certainly appears to fill an understandable 
human desire for objectivity and precision.
133 But, some critics of CBA believe this appearance is more of 
an illusion than a reality.
134  Some people have felt that “[s]ome debates were so emotionally charged, you 
couldn’t even conduct them  – and c ertainly not in public.”
135  In other words, certain arguments, 
comparisons, and trade-offs are considered improper or taboo.
136  Such process concerns as emotional 
impacts of deliberating over and making tragic choices,
137 explicitly instead of implicitly, help explain 
some people’s resistance to CBA.  Expressive views of law
138 view choices among incommensurable 
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options and processes by which societies make those choices as signals of those societies’ identities
139 or 
aspirations.
140  Such views of social decision-making are related to a psychological model of individual 
self-signaling.
141  When and how policy makers decide to utilize CBA methodology and techniques can in 
this way shape our society just as certain theoretical models shaped modern financial markets.
142  
As an economist notes, “[i]n principle, cost-benefit analyses are accounting exercises, a way of 
adding up the benefits and costs … and then comparing them.  In practice, however, cost-benefit analyses 
are rich, economic exercises that bring to bear … microeconomic reasoning … and a host of interesting 
empirical evidence.”
143  But, CBA does not count emotional impacts when analyzing benefits and costs.  
Some omissions are implicit and unconscious, because it has become a second-hand, automatic reflex for 
CBA to ignore much affect because of the dual conservative forces of precedent and tradition.  Other 
exclusions of emotions in CBA are conscious, deliberate, explicit and intentional choices due to beliefs 
and feelings that emotional variables are categorically  distinct from unemotional variables;
144 and 
therefore insurmountably difficult to measure, too complex to easily analyze, or too nebulous to make 
operational.      
To illustrate how EIA differs from CBA, reconsider the case which this Article started with, 
namely the SEC rule that requires mutual funds to have independent board chairs and a higher percentage 
of independent directors than before. CBA of requiring independent board chairs and more independent 
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directors for mutual funds considered, among other f inancial costs, these:
145 (1) search costs to find 
qualified board candidates; (2) new board member salaries; (3) higher compensation for independent 
board chairs; and (4) additional remuneration to retain independent legal counsel and other support staff 
for new independent directors.  CBA considered, among other financial benefits, these:
146 (1) enhancing 
quality of fund governance; (2) fostering more capital formation; (3) increasing accountability by fund 
boards; and (4) increasing market liquidity.   
EIA o f requiring independent board chairs and more independent directors  for mutual funds 
evaluates likely magnitudes of such negative emotional impacts as these: (1) a false sense of security by 
fund shareholders resulting in less individual vigilance; (2) additional influence costs;
147 (3) reduced 
board cohesiveness; and (4) transition costs of changing board cultures.  EIA should also quantify such 
positive emotional impacts  as these: (1) greater investor confidence and trust in mutual funds; (2) 
avoiding documented perverse, psychological shortcomings to simply disclosing conflicts of interest;
148 
(3) lower decision-making anxiety for potential fund shareholders; (4) lower stress for existing fund 
shareholders; and (5) placebo effects.
149  The first positive emotional impact cited above is one that the 
SEC often cites in proposing rules,
150 but makes no attempt to quantify by its own empirical survey 
research or any reference to data from existing survey measures.  The second positive emotional impact 
cited above requires explicitly comparing the proposed substantive regulation with the most common 
policy alternative in the SEC’s regulatory toolkit, namely mandatory disclosure.  This example thus 
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illustrates how EIA could lead to a regulatory outcome different from traditional policy instruments under 
CBA.   
EIA should obtain evidence from, among other sources, a request for public comment and 
empirical affective data as to whether and, if so, how much this proposed rule would actually promote the 
positive emotional impact  of more investor confidence.  T he affirming majority of the SEC 
Commissioners merely and summarily asserted the value of promoting investor confidence as buzzwords 
and as a mantra,
151 without engaging in EIA to measure investor confidence in at least quantitative, if not 
dollar terms.
152 Both dissenting SEC Commissioners criticized and questioned the affirming majority for 
such vague assertions.
153  Thus, a contentious part of the controversy over these mutual fund governance 
rules is the actual size of a particular and often cited positive emotional impact, namely more investor 
confidence over and greater trust in securities markets.  In other words, despite all of the fuss over what 
are the likely costs of complying with these mutual fund governance rules, a  crucial  part of  the 
controversy over these mutual fund governance rules is due to differences in beliefs about whether the 
SEC can and should perform EIA of investor confidence.    
It is quite intuitive that there was a flight  from U.S. stock markets because  investors lost 
confidence and trust in our stock markets after our string of infamous corporate scandals.  A recent 
empirical study by several economists at the Brookings Institution provided ballpark estimates that 
suggest the crisis in U.S. corporate governance reduced the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
first year after the scandals from a low of 0.20% to a high of 0.48% of GDP, or approximately $21 to 
$49.9 billion.
154 In their base case, GDP drops 0.34%, or approximately $35.4 billion.  To p lace these 
base case numbers in comparative perspective and familiar contexts, those numbers are in the range of 
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what the federal government spent annually on homeland security, or the surge in annual total costs of 
U.S. oil imports due to a $10 or 38% rise in the per barrel price of crude oil.
155  They base their 
calculations on conservative estimates of how the corporate governance crisis impacts stock market 
wealth, which in turn affects consumer expenditures and investment,
156 calibrated according to a model of 
the U.S. economy due to the Federal Reserve Board.
157  Their estimates are conservative because they do 
not include longer-term supply side disturbances related to bankruptcies of several major corporations, or 
inefficiencies due to distorted consumer,  corporate, and investor decisions based upon misreported 
corporate earnings.  There is additional evidence that on average, for each dollar by which a corporation 
misleadingly inflates its market value, once its misconduct has been revealed that firm loses not only that 
dollar, but also an additional $2.47, of which $0.18 is from expected legal penalties, while $2.29 is from 
stock market reputation penalties defined as expected losses in present value of future cash flows 
resulting from increased contracting and financing costs.
158   
A trust-based explanation of why investors deserted American stock markets would imply that 
restoring, maintaining, and promoting investor confidence about and trust in our stock markets is crucial 
to U.S. economic prosperity.  But trust plays no role in standard neoclassical financial models about 
investors’ optimal portfolio choices and rates of stock market participation.  Only very recently does a 
financial model analytically demonstrate how people’s fears of being cheated reduce their participation in 
stock markets.
159  Reasonable calibrations of this model demonstrate that mistrust in stock markets alone 
can explain why many wealthy Americans do not buy stocks, and account for cross-country differences in 
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stock market participation rates.
160  In addition, there is recent experimental and survey evidence that 
family background, gender,  and political ideology affect how much American college students believe 
that economic theory predicts outcomes in a double auction.
161  These findings also extend to Russian 
students.
162  Also recently,  a  study  conducting five experiments  finds  “that incidental emotions 
significantly influence trust in unrelated settings.  Happiness and gratitude – emotions with positive 
valence – increase trust, and anger – an emotion with negative valence – decreases trust.”
163    
Future research should analyze how such emotions as anxiety and frustration influence trust.
164  A 
pair of legal scholars recently proposed a cognitive theory about optimal trust and explored its p olicy 
implications for two settings: corporate governance and doctor-patient relationships.
165  They note that the 
socially optimal amount of fraud is not zero because most people do are not willing to live in societies 
having the high costs required to deter all deception and fraud.  Similarly, the socially optimal amounts of 
automobile accidents and automobile pollution are not zero because most people are not willing to live in 
societies without cars.  While determination of the socially optimal amount of non-zero fraud is easy to do 
in theory by just solving for the amount of fraud at which its marginal social costs and marginal social 
benefits are set equal, such determination  is difficult in practice due to  imperfect and incomplete data 
concerning actual empirical magnitudes of marginal social benefits and marginal social costs.  Also, 
financial economist Michael C. Jensen recently advocated that financial theory and practice develop a 
language for how integrity affects corporate, market, personal, and policy issues.
166   
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One possible concern about EIA is that while people feel emotional impacts, those experiences 
are temporary psychological effects that dissipate with repeated experience or self-practice.  A second 
concern about EIA is that emotional  impacts often are overreactions at least initially that people self-
correct over time.  But, just as often corrections might be over-corrections.
167  A third reservation about 
EIA is that emotional overreactions get corrected by financial markets, with the so-called level -headed 
earning arbitrage profits at the expense of so-called irrationally emotionally-driven traders.  The rebuttal 
to such a false belief is that any such alleged market correction process is costly and lengthy.  In addition, 
there always is a new supply of people who are motivated at least partially by their emotions, so by the 
time that financial markets have adjusted to the excessive optimism of the 1980’s, there is the irrational 
exuberance of the 1990’s.       
A related set of issues about EIA involve the variability of emotions across time.
168 Two familiar 
examples of people being unable to accurately forecast their own future emotions are people buying too 
little food when they shop for groceries on a full stomach and often those same people buying too much 
food when they shop for groceries on an empty stomach.  There is psychological evidence that people 
adapt over time both faster and more than they and others expected to happiness,
169 and some types of 
unhappiness.
170  Social psychological research into how accurately people can forecast affect reveals that 
people overestimate both the duration and intensity of their future happiness or unhappiness in response 
to changes in their external circumstances.
171  Such affective overestimation  can be due to a several 
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172 including a focusing illusion,
173 a distinction bias,
174 and immune neglect.
175  Regardless of its 
cause, people inaccurately anticipate their adaptation upon a hedonic treadmill.
176  A pair of psychologists 
introduced the phrase “hedonic treadmill” to suggest that pursuit of happiness is akin to a person on 
a treadmill, who must keep working just to stay in the same place.
177  People also incorrectly predict 
other people’s emotional reactions,
178 and their own hedonic adaptation.
179   
Recent advances in emotions research provide several refinements in our understanding about 
temporal dimensions of emotions. First, people accurately forecast specific emotions in contrast with 
experiencing focusing illusions about  happiness  or  subjective  well-being.
180    Second, inaccurate 
judgments about anticipated and remembered emotions can function to motivate pursuit of and striving 
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181  Third, people feel emotions not only during emotional experiences themselves, but also upon 
anticipation and retrospection of emotions.  Recent psychological research  provides experimental 
evidence that people feel more intense emotions upon contemplating these emotional events in the future 
than in the past: Thanksgiving, an annoying noise, an all expenses paid ski vacation, and menstruation.
182        
Notwithstanding these eventual adjustments people make after emotional impacts, two points are 
critical for this Article’s analysis.  First, based upon their inaccurate affective forecasts, people make 
decisions, some of which are irreversible, are very costly to reverse, or at least have lasting impacts.  
Second, EIA does not ask people to forecast ex ante their affect in the future, but instead envisions asking 
people to report ex post recently experienced affect. 
The  previously discussed empirical  study  by economists at the Brookings Institution
183 
demonstrates that even if emotional impacts are transitory or people can adapt to affective reactions, 
affect has irreversible and permanent consequences upon such traditional economic variables as levels of 
aggregate consumption, investment, stock prices, and stock volume.  More generally, incorrect affective 
forecasts  will transform  any forward-looking behavior, such as  commercial real estate purchases, 
commercial and personal borrowing, consumer durable expenditures, mortgage financing and refinancing, 
new home construction, and residential real estate purchases.  As 1972 Nobel Laureate in economics
184 
Kenneth Arrow noted, expectations concerning the future affect many economic decisions in the 
present.
185  EIA should build upon recent economic theoretical research about how such affect as anxiety 
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and fear influence people’s consumption, investment, and savings decisions.
186 Economists have only just 
begun to analyze theoretical models of how regulators can and should take into account and utilize such 
affect as anxiety and fear to influence people’s behavior.
187   
EIA is able to address whether investors being concerned or scared about mutual fund board 
independence supports increasing the percentage of independent directors on mutual fund boards from 
50% to 75%.  EIA also can address whether and how much of a reduction in levels of mutual fund 
investors’ anxiety justifies requiring mutual funds to retain independent board chairs.  In thinking about 
distinctions among financial regulations for which  EIA could be important, and those for which EIA 
might not, behavioral finance research is relevant.
188  For example,  EIA should matter more for rules 
about closed-end funds, which are simply “firms whose only asset is a portfolio of common stocks,”
189 
than open-end funds, which “stand ready to  buy or sell additional shares at a price equal to the fund’s net 
asset value per share.”
190  A reason for this difference is that individuals are more involved with closed-
end funds than with open-end funds.  For that same reason, the observed empirical finding that closed-end 
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fund shares usually  trade for less than the per share market value of the assets the fund holds is  a 
puzzle,
191 while “[t]he share price of an open-end fund always equals net asset value.”
192  
To decide in what financial environments EIA adds value to CBA in regulatory and policy 
evaluation, it would help courts, the SEC, and securities law scholars to answer these questions.  Which 
SEC rules are most likely to result in emotional impacts on individual retail investors?  Which SEC rules 
are most likely to result in emotional impacts on at least some decision-makers at large institutional 
investors?
193  EIA can and should  also examine how the nature and size of emotional impacts differ 
between individual retail investors, such as the stereotypical widows and orphans, and large institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds and pension plan sponsors.  In other words, how does this pair of negative 
emotional impacts differ: “I don't want to lose my nest egg” versus “I don't want to be fired”?  And, how 
does this pair of positive emotional impacts differ: “I want my investments to double in value” versus “I 
want my annual bonus to be huge”? 
An understandable concern at least among non-economists about  CBA is that it privileges 
economics in policy evaluation by framing costs and benefits as positives or negatives that economists 
add or subtract.  But,  economists  have  enjoyed  privileged roles in  public policy for  awhile,
194 as 
evidenced for example by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA).
195 The CEA consists of three 
independent economists who, according to its founding mandate, “provide the President with objective 
economic analysis and advice on the development and implementation of a wide range of domestic and 
international economic policy issues.”
196  The CEA prepares an overview annually of U.S. economic 
                                                 
191 Charles M. C. Lee et al., Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 J. FIN. 75 (1991); and Navin 
Chopra et al., Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds Are a Sentiment Index, 48 J. FIN. 801 (1993).  
192 Id, at n.12. 
193 See e.g., Andrew W. Lo & Dmitry V. Repin, The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing, 14 
J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 323 (2002). 
194  See generally  MICHAEL  A.  BERNSTEIN,  A  PERILOUS  PROGRESS:  ECONOMISTS AND  PUBLIC  PURPOSE IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001).  But see WHAT DO ECONOMISTS CONTRIBUTE? (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1999). 
195 http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/. 
196 The Employment Act of 1946. H.R. 2202, S. 380, 15 U.S.C. § 1021 et seq.  See generally G. J. Santoni, The 
Employment Act of 1946: Some History Notes, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Nov. 1986, at 5-16.  See also 
http://www.americanpresident.org/action/orgchart/administration_units/councilofeconomicadvisers/a_index.shtml. Emotional Impact Analysis 
 
32 
progress in a document known as the Economic Report of the President.
197  The CEA has a staff, which 
“includes about 20 academic economists, plus four permanent economic statisticians.”
198  Another 
example of the privileging of economics in law is that “[i]n the last few decades, the law and economics 
movement has had a tremendous impact on legal studies.”
199   
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman believes that psychologically informing economics is likely to be 
more influential and effective than attempting to displace economics from law and public policy;
200  and 
makes this observation:  
there are really two disciplines that are in charge, and they’re the economists and the 
lawyers.  And the economists, in particular, are the gatekeepers, the academic 
gatekeepers of the policy world.  They do the research, they interpret the research, and so 
everything goes through them in terms of what actually gets implemented. … and this 
situation is one that is not going to change soon.
201 
  
Thus, EIA would redress a number of shortcomings of CBA as financial and securities regulators 
currently practice it.  EIA would simply replace or supplement a dominant form of economic analysis in 
policymaking, namely CBA with a broader, more accurate brand of psychologically informed economics. 
III.  Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking 
A.  Does the SEC Engage in Cost-Benefit Analysis? 
As a  general empirical and factual matter, SEC rulemakings often contain  sections with 
apparently extensive CBA.   A casual perusal of many SEC p roposed and final rules  finds a   larger 
percentage of pages in them devoted to discussing CBA than one might expect.  For example, the final 
version of the above-mentioned controversial mutual fund governance rule (requiring independent board 
chairs and 75 percent of board members being independent) contained a section “III. Discussion,” which 
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had a subsection  “I. Costs Resulting From Exemptive Rule Amendments.”
202  Both concurring and 
dissenting SEC Commissioners also engaged in their own additional CBA discussions.
203  Thus, a total of 
78% to 79% of the pages in the final version of this rule is devoted to CBA discussions.  This might not 
be surprising because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded this rule to the SEC for 
consideration of its costs.
204  Another example of an SEC proposal for a rule defining the term “nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization” contained a section  “VI.  Consideration of the Costs and 
Benefits of Proposed Rule,” which made up approximately 12% to 13% of the pages in that proposal.
205   
A careful examination of these and other such pages reveals that  CBA by the SEC is  often 
uninformative, should not be taken seriously, and ultimately is likely counterproductive.  Also in those 
areas where EIA is crucial, such as the emotional impacts of investor confidence and trust in the integrity 
of securities markets, often cited by the SEC, the amount, level, quality, and sophistication of CBA is 
disappointing.   
As a matter of general impression, the SEC rulemaking process clearly at least appears to attempt 
some discussion of CBA.   Reasonable people can  debate whether SEC attempts at CBA are more 
analogous to disingenuous image or public relations and informational management spin or instead 
sincere public discourse after careful information acquisition and examination.  Reasonable individuals 
can also  disagree over whether SEC discussions of CBA are understandable reactions to perceived 
demand by securities investors and securities industry professionals for the SEC to e ngage in  CBA 
justifications of its rulemaking or alternatively  overreactions, analogous to physicians engaging in 
practicing defensive medicine due to fears of unjustified malpractice lawsuits. It  is an open empirical 
question whether the SEC already possesses or might develop a requisite institutional competence to 
engage successfully in EIA.   
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Thus, while the SEC engages in CBA in an ad hoc and haphazard fashion, the SEC typically does 
not perform formal, systematic CBA of its regulations.  Neither do any of these other U.S. financial 
regulators: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC); the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  
However, current SEC Commissioner Annette Nazareth, during a Senate Banking C ommittee 
confirmation hearing on her nomination, said that she was “keenly aware of the cost of regulation and the 
importance of balancing these costs with the benefits that regulation seeks to achieve.”
206  
Each of the aforementioned U.S. financial regulators: the SEC, CFTC, FDIC, FTC, and Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, is exempt from those major provisions of the executive orders that require 
CBA by executive agencies,
207  because each is an independent regulatory agency, not  an executive 
agency.
208  The SEC and the other aforementioned U.S. financial regulators differ in this regard at least 
statutorily from U.S. executive agencies, such as the EPA, which engages in CBA in evaluating 
alternative regulations about environmental social risks.
209  Using the phrase “independent agency” to 
describe the SEC and similar financial regulatory agencies is of course ironic because “independent” 
financial regulatory agencies, such as the SEC, “are not independent of politics; they are highly dependent 
upon the industries that they are charged with regulating.  That dependency is mediated through 
Congress, which uses its mediating role to extract financial support from the financial services industry, 
accounting firms and public companies.”
210  Thus, the SEC’s exemption from CBA stems from a highly 
formalistic distinction between it and other regulatory agencies that, in reality, all are more political (and 
beholden to the political branches) than independent.       
B.  Will the SEC Engage in Cost-Benefit Analysis? 
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As mentioned already, a number of legal  scholars have advocated that the SEC engage in more 
formal CBA.
211   While the public at present seems unlikely to push for CBA of securities regulation in 
response to a perception of too much financial and securities regulation, either Congress in response to 
lobbying pressure from the securities industry could impose CBA,
212 or the SEC and other U.S. financial 
regulators may preemptively impose CBA upon themselves due to “congressional pressure, interest group 
lobbying, bureaucratic (but nonexpertise-based) policy views, or bureaucratic protection of turf or other 
self-interest.”
213  Should the SEC and other U.S. financial regulators adopt CBA, they can learn from the 
significant experience of the SEC’s United Kingdom counterpart, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
which is mandated by statute to engage in CBA of its regulations.
214  American and British scholars and 
economic consultants  have studied formal  CBA of FSA financial regulations.
215  An American legal 
scholar has recently advocated for a number of compelling reasons that the United States also adopt a 
single, federal financial services agency that is akin to the United Kingdom’s FSA.
216  
A possible concern about EIA is that it will not impose a meaningful constraint on  SEC rule-
making.  But such a reservation presumes that left by itself the SEC will regulate too much.  There is a 
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vast amount of empirical evidence that stringent SEC regulation facilitates capital market development 
and economic growth.
217  It should be clear that EIA can suggest and justify regulations that CBA might 
not because EIA but not CBA takes into account such positive emotional impacts as investor confidence 
and trust.  Symmetrically EIA can prevent and eliminate regulations that CBA might not because EIA but 
not CBA takes into account such negative emotional impacts as anxiety and fear.  An example of a policy 
that might fail EIA are non-specific terrorist alerts that only serve to incite hysteria and panic among the 
public at large that more than offsets any unemotional regulatory gains in terms of  detecting and 
preventing terrorist attacks.  Financial regulators engaging in EIA should not let other people’s or their 
own preconceived notions about whether there is too much or too little financial regulation overall dictate 
EIA of specific proposed rules and regulations.  Instead, a virtue of EIA is that it has a potential to and 
should provide a principled and unbiased tool for evaluating alternative regulatory policies.   
C.  Relevance of Criticisms of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Non-Financial Regulation 
Some people feel that routinely utilizing CBA for making policy decisions about environmental 
regulations is disturbing and inappropriate for a host of reasons.  Applications of CBA to environmental, 
health, and safety regulations have understandably generated much contentious debate and heated 
controversy.
218 Some believe that, as is also possible with an increasingly influential Precautionary 
Principle,
219 certain politicians and interest groups utilize CBA for delay, inaction, and regulatory 
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220  Other legitimate concerns about CBA include these critiques: anti-regulatory tendencies;
221 
cognitive biases;
222  commodification  in terms of assigning economic value to  items traditionally not 
considered in economic terms;
223 ideological biases;
224 ignoring of equity and justice considerations;
225 
incommensurability of values to money;
226 indeterminacy;
227 its poor track record,
228 measurement 
errors;
229 mistaken beliefs about consequences of policies;
230 over-discounting of far-future consequences 
such as the possibility of catastrophic global warming;
231 reliance upon non-deliberative and unreflective 
preferences;
232 and undermining democratic process.
233  Not all these concerns about CBA in non-
financial regulation apply to CBA in financial regulation.  For example, dignity and other concerns about 
valuation of human life,
234 or loss of limb are unlikely to arise in applying CBA to financial regulations.  
But some other concerns about CBA of non-financial regulations, such as its potential for anti-regulatory 
bias, political misuse, organizational delay, or institutional paralysis, also may apply to CBA of securities 
regulations.   
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IV.  Conceptual and Measurement Issues with Emotional Impact Analysis 
A precursor to EIA is research by Richard Zerbe, Jr. and his co-authors about incorporating moral 
sentiments into CBA.
235  Zerbe’s approach confronted and tackled conceptual difficulties and issues about 
including moral sentiments in  CBA.  This Article advocates counting and including  not only  moral 
sentiments in analyzing policy, but also  emotional impacts.  But  Zerbe’s approach bracketed any 
discussion of measurement issues associated with incorporating moral sentiments into CBA.  Fortunately, 
many issues that measuring and quantifying emotional impacts have been addressed already in empirical, 
experimental, and theoretical research by economists and psychologists about happiness.   Indeed, 
happiness is an alternative metric to money or wealth for measuring emotional impacts.     
There  is a variety of  emotional impacts  that  EIA  might  helpfully  incorporate, including 
distributional or  equity concerns,
236 e thical  considerations,
237 moral  consequences,
238 and process 
concerns.
239 But if regulators are to incorporate these affective variables into their policy deliberations and 
evaluations, then regulators must be able to consistently quantify or measure such variables in order to 
improve upon their decision-making process by adding such affective variables to CBA.  Fortunately, 
there are several precursors to EIA, including arguably Adam Smith’s first book, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), published seventeen years before his famous book, The Wealth of Nations (1776).
240 
A.  Moral (and Immoral) Sentiments 
EIA builds upon research analyzing the desirability and feasibility of policy makers taking into 
account moral sentiments.  Zerbe utilizes the phrase “moral sentiments” to mean concern for other people, 
beings, o r entities in the form of paternalistic or non-paternalistic altruistic preferences.  People clearly 
feel moral sentiments as defined here.  Thus, moral sentiments are particular examples or forms of 
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emotional impacts.  In fact, many individuals are more than willing to make charitable private donations 
of clothes, food, money, labor services, lodging, supplies, and time in order to express their moral 
sentiments towards victims of such natural disasters as hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  Zerbe and his co-
authors propose measuring moral sentiments by an individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for them.
241   
Moral sentiments are but one kind of ethical and other values missing from CBA because such 
values are not considered to be a legitimate part of CBA, are seen as being difficult to quantify, and are 
affective in their nature.  Zerbe’s approach advocates replacing the standard KH criterion (defined in the 
last section) for CBA  with an aggregate KHM (for Kaldor-Hicks-Moral) measure that adds to the 
standard KH criterion one additional requirement: if there is a WTP or willingness to accept (WTA) for a 
particular item, then we should count its WTP or WTA.
242 Zerbe’s approach proposes to utilize WTP or 
WTA as ways of measuring and monetizing people’s moral sentiments.  Potential examples include 
amounts of money that individuals are willing to pay to express their moral sentiments towards pets,
243 
compassion towards animals,
244 or concern for trees.
245  To be clear, EIA does not advocate WTP or WTA 
measures to quantify emotional impacts; nor does it even propose monetizing emotional impacts.  To be 
sure, if regulators engage in both CBA and EIA, they will have to combine those analyses.  They can do 
so by attempted monetizing of emotional impacts, or conversion of monetary costs and benefits into 
measures of subjective well-being.    
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Zerbe’s approach deals effectively and thoroughly with several arguments against policy makers 
taking into account moral sentiments.
246 A particular concern with including moral sentiments is double 
counting.
247  Another  concern with including moral sentiments  is an invariance claim that non-
paternalistic altruistic moral sentiments are unimportant because they simply reinforce those decisions 
that would be made in their absence.
248  Zerbe finds that arguments against policy makers taking into 
account moral sentiments are incorrect or unpersuasive.  Although Zerbe’s approach focuses on moral 
sentiments, Zerbe notes that moral sentiments can include immoral sentiments, where people feel such 
negative affect as anger, envy, hatred, jealousy, or vengeance towards others.   
B.  Amoral Sentiments 
Upon a moment’s reflection, it becomes clear that Zerbe’s moral sentiments are paradigmatic 
examples of what this Article has termed positive emotional impacts.  Emotional impacts can arise from 
ethical or income distributional concerns.
249 But emotional impacts do not have to be moral sentiments or 
immoral sentiments, because emotions do not have to arise from a moral  or  immoral source.  For 
example, in a sample of 909 employed women, commuting to and from their work produced the lowest 
levels of retrospective well-being out of a list of 19 activities.
250  In other words, stress from daily 
commuting is bona fide affective cost which can be quite large,
251  but not a moral sentiment or an 
immoral sentiment.  Commuters may feel anger towards their fellow commuters for clogging up roads, 
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but such anger or road rage is at least conceptually distinct from driving stress, though it might be related 
to such feelings as anger, boredom, despair, frustration, or loss of control.  Moral sentiments are examples 
of emotional impacts.  Thus, moral sentiments form a subset, but only a proper subset of the set of 
emotional impacts.  Zerbe’s approach justifies including as part of CBA not just moral sentiments, but 
any consequence with a WTP or WTA.  But because of well-known problems with WTP or WTA,
252 EIA 
advocates counting and including  emotional impacts  by other procedures, such  as in terms of their 
impacts on standard  financial  economic variables, including liquidity, prices, volatility, and  trading 
volume in securities markets. 
C.  Measuring and Quantifying Emotional Impacts 
Next, we turn to issues about measurement and quantification of emotional impacts.  Zerbe’s 
approach put aside such measurement issues.  Zerbe’s approach of eliciting WTP for moral sentiments 
suggests a straightforward method of conducting a Contingent Valuation Survey (CVS) asking people to 
forecast how much they are likely to pay  for moral sentiments. Unlike other social scientists, most 
economists have traditionally been quite skeptical of the accuracy, informativeness, and reliability of 
questionnaires and other self-descriptions.
253  But many economists, legal academics, and policy analysts 
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have long adopted CVS methodology in assessing environmental, health, and safety regulations, despite 
its many problems, such as its hypothetical nature.
254   
Fortunately and more recently, a number of economists have begun to employ  other survey 
methodologies besides CVS.
255  Applications include researching behavioral macroeconomics (that 
incorporates realistic behavioral assumptions grounded in psychological and sociological observations);
256 
conducting field research in development economics;
257 analyzing the observed relationship between 
income and subjective well-being;
258 analyzing the switch to business majors and careers during the 
1970s and 1980s;
259 explaining adjustments in the use of contraceptives to limit family size;
260 and 
understanding why similar households end up with very different wealth levels.
261    
Self-reported measures are ubiquitous in research about happiness and subjective well-being 
(SWB);
262 although there remain concerns about  exactly  what  such reports mean and measure.
263  
Psychological evidence in experimental settings and from reported  happiness surveys finds that people 
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systematically underestimate how much their own tastes change over time.
264  For example, recently there 
is research utilizing economic field data from a l arge outdoor-apparel company finding that people are 
over-influenced by order-date temperature when placing catalog purchases for winter clothing.
265   Survey 
data that measure current levels of investor confidence,
266 investor sentiment,
267 or consumer sentiment,
268 
avoid such forecasting error problems. 
EIA can and should build upon a growing body of research on the economics of happiness.
269  
Two national magazines featured happiness research on their covers.
270  Just recently, a national morning 
news show included a segment about empirical psychological research what makes people happy.
271 A 
number of recent books offer summaries of this already sizeable but still rapidly growing literature.
272  
Some happiness economics research utilizes regression equations involving large samples of random 
individuals,
273 to provide monetary estimates of how much any event in life impacts SWB.
274  Large 
cross-sectional samples of hundreds of thousands of individuals’ expressed life satisfaction across 
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countries and over time reveal remarkably consistent patterns in what determines an individual’s self-
reported happiness.
275  For example, a British economist and an American economist estimated that 
having a lasting marriage, as compared to widowhood, generated as much happiness on average as 
receiving approximately $100,000 in 1990 dollars annually.
276  Similarly, these researchers found that in a 
random sample of approximately 16,000 American adult females and males, increasing the regular 
frequency of sex from once a month to once a week had an impact on happiness for an average American 
that was equivalent to $50,000 of additional income yearly.
277  They also discovered that undergoing a 
divorce produced unhappiness that was equivalent on average to a reduction of $66,000 per year.
278   
Again, to be clear EIA does not advocate nor endorse that regulators have to monetize a rule’s 
emotional impacts to be able to account for, measure, and quantify emotional impacts.  In contrast, Adler 
explicitly advocates monetizing anxiety or fear about certain non-financial risks by engaging in what he 
calls fear assessment, copying the phrase risk assessment.
279  His proposal argues that contingent-
valuation surveys are the appropriate way to price fear.
280  He states, “what about welfare-enhancing 
mental states, like cheerfulness, happiness, serenity, excitement, and pleasure?  Shouldn’t agencies 
generally engage in a broad practice of hedonic assessment, including but not limited to fear assessment?  
This seems incorrect.”
281  This Article disagrees and specifically endorses that agencies can and should 
engage in a broad form of hedonic assessment, namely EIA.  In fact, Adler’s quotation specifically cites 
three pages from a book about happiness economics, which provide four examples of how measuring 
                                                 
275 See generally, Frey & Stutzer, supra note 262; and FREY & STUTZER, supra note 272. 
276 David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being Over Time in Britain and the U.S.A., 88 J. PUB. ECON. 
1359, 1373 (2004). 
277 David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Money, Sex and Happiness: An Empirical Study, 106 SCAND. J. 
ECON. 393, 401-04 (2004). 
278 Id.  See also Jonathan Gardner & Andrew J. Oswald, Do Divorcing Couples Become Happier By Breaking Up?, 
169 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y A 319 (2006).  
279 Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 997 (2004). 
280 Id., at 1024-34. 
281 Id., at 986-87 (footnotes omitted). Emotional Impact Analysis 
 
45 
happiness can inform anti-poverty policies, non-CBA evaluation of government expenditures, tax 
policies, and welfare programs.
282 
SWB measures raise a critical question of what  precisely  is the  empirical and theoretical 
relationship between economists’ notion of utility and psychologists’ measures of SWB.  Two economists 
argue that while SWB does not coincide with flow utility, it does bear a systematic relationship to it.
283  A 
detailed analysis of whether policy makers can and should utilize measures of happiness or SWB instead 
of money or wealth is beyond the scope of this Article, but such issues are considered in a companion
284 
and complementary Articles,
285 as well as Articles proposing a happiness-based theory of corporations,
286 
a life satisfaction approach to environmental valuation,
287  and tax reforms based upon on happiness 
considerations.
288  What is crucial to note is that EIA does not require nor eschew monetization of 
emotional impacts. EIA is agnostic over what metric to account for, measure, and take into account 
emotional impacts.   EIA merely advocates that regulators account for, measure, and take into account 
emotional impacts utilizing some metric.  If regulators also engage in CBA, they will then have to either 
convert non-monetary measures of emotional impacts to dollar equivalents or convert dollar measures of 
costs and benefits into happiness or SWB equivalents.      
In addition to affective survey data, such as that concerning investor confidence, this Article 
advocates that financial regulators utilize financial data that securities markets automatically and routinely 
create as by-products, namely information about liquidity, prices, quantities, volatility, and  trading 
                                                 
282 FREY & STUTZER, supra note 272, at 175-77. 
283 Miles Kimball & Robert Willis,  Utility and Happiness, (Mar. 3, 2006),  available at  http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~mkimball/pdf/uhap.pdf.  See also Miles Kimball et al., Unhappiness After Hurricane Katrina, 
(Feb. 11, 2006), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mkimball/pdf/katrina.pdf. 
284 Peter H. Huang,  Happiness and Evaluating Financial Policy Affect,  presentation in the panel on Law and 
Emotions  at the International Society for Research on Emotions, Atlanta, GA (Aug.  7, 2006),  available at 
http://www.cas.gsu.edu/isre2006/program.html. 
285 Peter H. Huang, Law and Positive Psychology: Happiness, Affective Neuroscience, and Paternalism, presentation 
at the Fifth International Positive Psychology Summit, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 5-7, 2006). 
286 James McConvill,  The Separation of Ownership and Control Under a Happiness-Based Theory of the 
Corporation, COMP. LAW. 2005, 26(2), 35, 44-51. 
287 Heinz Welsch,  Environment and Happiness: Valuation of Air Pollution Using Life Satisfaction Data, 58 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 801 (2006). 
288 Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Stop Taxing Happiness: A New Perspective on Progressive Taxation, 2 PITT. 
TAX REV. 65, 65-87 (2005). Emotional Impact Analysis 
 
46 
volume to measure  traditional economic and financial consequences of changes in such affective 
variables as investor confidence.  This roundabout method of measuring  indirectly emotional impacts 
avoids controversies about reliability of direct measures of affect.  It also satisfies a preference that many 
economists and policy makers have for objective measures over subjective measures and measures that 
are behaviorally generated and thus observable to and verifiable by others instead of measures that are 
self-reported and therefore unobservable to and unverifiable by others.  Finally, such objective well-being 
measures complement subjective well-being measures.
289      
Three recent econometric studies illustrate how to measure the financial and economic impacts of 
sudden changes of investor mood and consumer sentiment.  One study  found an economically and 
statistically significant negative stock market reaction exceeding 7% monthly to losses by national soccer 
teams, and that elimination from a major international soccer tournament is associated with a next-day 
return on a national stock market index 38 basis points lower than average.
290  To place this empirical 
finding in perspective, 40 basis points of the November 2005 United Kingdom market capitalization was 
$11.5 billion.
291  This recent study also documents that s imilar  stock market loss effects exist for 
basketball, cricket, ice hockey, and rugby in countries where those sports are popular.
292  Another study 
found empirical evidence that wins against foreign rivals in the Winner's Cup by one, but not the other 
two, of the three teams that dominates the Turkish soccer league increased stock market returns.
293  A 
                                                 
289 Jonathan Levav, The Mind and the Body: Subjective Well-Being in an Objective World, in DO EMOTIONS HELP 
OR  HURT  DECISION  MAKING?  (Roy Baumeister et al. eds., 2006),  available at 
http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/1835/Emotion%20and%20Decision%20SWB%20C
hapter%2Epdf. 
290  Alex Edmans et al.,  Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns,  J.  FIN.  (forthcoming),  available at 
http://www.afajof.org/journal/forth_abstract.asp?ref=319.  See also Glenn W. Boyle & Brett Walter, Reflected Glory 
and Failure: International Sporting Success and the Stock Market, 13 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 225 (2003). 
291 Id. at 17. 
292 Id. at 27-29. 
293 Hakan Berument et al.,  Performance of Soccer on the Stock Market: Evidence from Turkey,  SOC.  SCI.  J. 
(forthcoming),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=807444#PaperDownload. Emotional Impact Analysis 
 
47 
third study found that the joy from winning the 1998 Soccer World Cup led to a positive, durable, and 
significant impact on demand for soccer games in France.
294      
One might be concerned that measuring  emotional impacts b oth directly by themselves and 
indirectly by their consequences on financial economic variables is double counting of them.  There are 
several  responses to such concerns.  First, emotional impacts themselves affect people’s happiness or 
subjective well-being and thus have normative significance to policy-makers.  Second, the consequences 
of emotional impacts on financial economic variables also influence people’s happiness or subjective 
well-being and thus have normative significance to policy-makers.  Third, because CBA places zero value 
upon emotional impacts, CBA does not measure them or their consequences upon financial and 
economics variables.  Fourth,  because emotional impacts result in changes in people’s future-oriented 
behavior, which in turn alters values of financial and economics variables, such emotional impacts as 
consumer sentiment are considered to be leading indicators of economic and financial activity.
295  Fifth, 
because changes in economic and financial outcomes have feedback effects in terms of having second-
order emotional impacts, policy makers would benefit from improving their ability to directly measure 
emotional impacts.   
D.  Concerns about Emotional Impacts 
  A reason that CBA ignores emotional impacts is that such variables are measurable at least in 
principle.  Similarly, economists have a methodological preference for or bias towards building models 
that have as their data or inputs variables which can be objectively measured and verified, such as initial 
endowments of  physical  capital, labor,  land,  energy, and  financial resources.  These variables are 
quantifiable and when markets function smoothly, they can also be priced on markets.  But, there are two 
categories of variables that e conomists also treat as exogenous parameters, which are  trickier for 
economists to measure.  These are producers’ technologies and consumers’ tastes.  Economic models 
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about how firms and societies engage in and can foster research and development, growth, and innovation 
obviously do not assume that production possibilities and technological constrai nts are fixed and 
immutable.  In addition, some economists have come to realize that individual preferences are culturally 
and socially constructed in addition to being malleable in response to advertising, experience, imitation, 
and persuasion.  Moreover, some consumer researchers, marketing professors, and psychologists address 
how to construct preferences.
296  EIA should build upon such research.                 
Another potential concern about EIA is whether or not it would be too  financially  costly or 
resource prohibitive to perform EIA studies, at least currently because regulations might have their own 
fairly unique set of emotional impacts.   At least with CBA, regulators can draw upon a pre-existing large 
number of CBA studies for analogous benefits and costs to a particular regulation.  But EIA does not 
already have that large collection of data at hand.  So basically every EIA must start more afresh, which is 
a big drawback in terms of passing timely regulations.  One response to such a concern is all this provides 
all the more reason to start requiring EIA.  A second response is that some forms of EIA, such as those 
about investor confidence or trust, process concerns, and social mood are important for all financial and 
securities regulations.  Moreover, high quality CBA, as opposed to the hand-waving, perfunctory 
discussions of CBA that many financial and securities regulators do, would not be cheap either.  EIA thus 
is expensive only in comparison  to low quality CBA all too prevalent among financial and securities 
regulators today. 
A direct and more basic response is that, as described above already, a small, but growing number 
of economists have already developed statistical techniques to examine how external factors affect SWB.  
For example, economists found that an individual’s own reported utility losses from terrorism are likely 
to far exceed terrorism’s purely economic consequences.
297  Another pair of researchers estimated the 
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monetary value of the cost of noise that the Schipol Airport in Amsterdam created.
298 Another study 
found that long hours of watching television is linked to higher material aspirations and anxiety and thus 
lower self-reported SWB.
299 Other economists found that changes in macroeconomic variables, such as a 
nation’s Gross Domestic Product and inflation rate, are correlated with reported SWB.
300  This group of 
economists also found that merely  a fear of unemployment generates large reductions in  SWB.
301  
Another pair of researchers found that people in transition economies on average self-reported SWB as 
compared to people in non-transition countries.
302 Their econometric analysis demonstrated that SWB 
levels are highest in countries with the most advanced market-oriented reforms and  lower inequality. 
Another study  provided  empirical  evidence of the affective and social costs of  competition in 
experimental games.
303  A final example of empirical SWB research is a study finding that higher levels 
of government spending reduce life satisfaction.
304   
EIA could concern critics of CBA who argue that CBA is really indeterminate and can be merely 
used as a smoke screen to justify a ny decision that a regulatory agency desires.  But, instead of 
exacerbating matters by throwing more imponderables into the mix,  EIA can prevent regulators from 
leaving out relevant emotional impacts.  One legal scholar has pointed out that what counts as benefits 
and what counts as costs are nowhere canonically specified in CBA.
305  By highlighting that emotional 
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impacts exist and should be taken into account, EIA disciplines regulators to specify explicitly and justify 
publicly what counts and what does not count in their analysis.  Recent experimental marketing research 
provides  evidence that people can attach “affective tags” to money in ways that influence their 
consumption behavior, such as people having negative feelings about monetary inheritances.
306   Perhaps 
similarly, people may have affective connotations about certain benefits and costs.  For example, some 
people could associate military expenditures with negative feelings.  Another example is that some people 
could associate disaster aid relief with positive feelings.  An individual’s affective tags for a particular 
expenditure could influence that individual’s perceived categories, numbers, and sizes of  that 
expenditure’s emotional impacts.   
In general, some regulations might not have emotional impacts.  But, because all investors are 
influenced, at least some of the time, by their own - or other investors’ - affect, emotions, and moods,
307 
SEC rules will always have some degree or level of  emotional impacts, such as reduced anxiety or 
decision-making stress, and increased fear or exuberance.
308  Also, if, as has often been claimed, a desired 
rationale of securities regulation is to bolster or promote investor confidence in the integrity of U.S. 
federal securities markets,
309 then, the SEC should utilize EIA to quantitatively incorporate impacts of 
investor attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and sentiment upon traditional economic and financial variables.   
E.  Political Concerns  
Clearly, financial regulation in general or securities regulation in particular, like any regulatory 
process, is a political process.  This political reality means that SEC regulators must consider how their 
actions make their supervising politicians feel and that, in turn, depends on how those  politicians' 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/papers/fryer_jackson.pdf. 
306 Jonathan Levav & A. Peter McGraw, Emotional Accounting: Feelings About Money and Consumer Choice, 
Presentation in the Decision Processes Seminar, Wharton (Jan. 23, 2006),  available at 
http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/1816/MS%2004%2D0091%20REVISEDSept21%2
Edoc. 
307 Peter H. Huang,  Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking Materiality of Information and 
Reasonableness of Investors, 13  SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 102-05 (2005) (presenting empirical and experimental 
evidence of moody investing).  See generally David A. Hoffman, The 'Duty' To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 536 (2006). 
308 Henry C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 840-50 (2000) 
(arguing that SEC disclosure and regulations contribute to investor optimism about stocks). Emotional Impact Analysis 
 
51 
constituencies feel towards SEC behavior.  For example, there might be a public outcry against SEC 
regulations that have a large positive CBA value.  Similarly, there could be strong public support in favor 
of SEC regulations that have a large negative CBA value. EIA should identify, describe, and quantify 
such public political pressures, and whether they reflect a rational affective reaction or instead a mistaken 
affective response due to strongly held irrational or verifiably incorrect beliefs.  There are many n on-
financial examples of public anxiety,
310 including concerns over brain cancer and tumors due to cell 
phone usage;
311 fear of radioactive fallout from a catastrophic nuclear power plant accident;
312 fear over 
episodic terrorist attacks in the U.S.;
313 and fear over safety of commercial air travel after 9/11.
314  A 
significant rise of at least 1,200 road fatalities due to people substituting less-safe driving for safer air 
travel after September 11, 2001’s terrorist attacks provides an example of how fear can result in severe 
indirect consequential effects.
315   These examples raise a question of whether a regulator should count as 
benefits and costs affective reactions that some people genuinely have, but some technical experts deem 
to be irrational and unfounded.
316   If people genuinely feel such allegedly phantom benefits and costs, 
then a strong argument suggests these fears deserve to be counted and recognized. 
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EIA is thus related to research in political science,
317 and political psychology.
318  This research 
analyzes the role of affect in deliberations,
319 international relations,
320 perceptions of risk,
321 political 
attributions,




326  Affective 
reactions also explain and interact with cognitive biases and heuristics in forming public perceptions of 
and (mis)understandings about public finance systems, including taxation.
327  EIA’s method of measuring 
emotional impacts is also related to recent research about  how emotions influence  bargaining and 
negotiations.
328    
F.  Cultural, Diversity, and Heterogeneity Concerns  
Although CBA can in principle deal with the reality that most regulations impose uneven benefits 
and impose unequal costs on different subpopulations, indexed by their age, ethnicity, income, race, sex, 
and wealth by differential weighting of costs and benefits a cross these subgroups of people,  CBA 
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privileges those costs and benefits that are not emotional impacts.  A desirable and important feature of 
EIA is being able to explicitly acknowledge and evaluate that regulations are likely to provide different 
emotional impacts upon people of different ages, ethnicities, genders, and races.  There is recent evidence 
finding differences in information processing in response to emotional advertisements due to motivational 
and cognitive changes associated with age.
329  There is a large amount of evidence that non-financial risk 
perceptions generally vary across gender and race.
330   
Similarly, there are numerous empirical findings providing evidence that: female mutual fund 
managers are less overconfident, follow less extreme investment styles, take less risk, and trade less than 
male fund managers;
331 retirement investment behavior differs by gender and marital status;
332 individual 
stock trading involves higher turnover for and lower performance by men than women;
333 women invest 
less than men in every study of simple investment choices, and thus appear to be financially more risk-
averse than men;
334 and the Survey of Consumer Finances financial risk tolerance measure differs 
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significantly over ethnicities and racial categories.
335  Such variation in risk attitudes, behavior, beliefs, 
perceptions, and tolerances across various discrete classifications, which the U.S. Constitution commits to 
equal protection of,
336  raises very serious issues of equality, equity, and justice for CBA of regulations.  
Some researchers  propose that regulatory “agencies and financial educators should target investor 
education on investments and financial risk to racial and ethnic groups in order to promote better choices 
for investing for financial goals.”
337  Recently, a legal scholar suggests diversity and independence of 
directors might be desirable because w omen and men directors may behave differently in terms of 
trusting or trustworthiness due to gender differences in their bases for trust and trustworthiness.
338  A 
sociologist empirically finds that gender is among the dimensions of diversity that help improve the stock 
portfolio performance of investment clubs.
339     
In addition to explicit measures of affective variables, there is also research about people’s 
implicit associations, attitudes, and cognitions.
340  Recent implicit measures of life satisfaction  permit 
analysis of cultural and ethnic differences in subjective well-being.
341  Similarly, implicit measures of risk 
attitude facilitate analysis of whether there are gender differences in risk behavior.
342  Finally, implicit 
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  This Article advocates an accounting, inclusion, quantification, and measurement of emotional 
impacts of financial policies and securities regulations.  It offers a theoretical examination of an empirical 
set of procedures and processes.  It argues that U.S. financial regulators should measure impacts that 
emotional impacts have upon traditional economic and financial variables.  It analyzes conceptual and 
measurement issues with emotional impacts.   
  Although this Article has focused on incorporating  emotional impacts in analyzing financial 
regulations generally and securities regulations particularly, much of its analysis also applies to non-
financial individual and social risks.  In fact, much of the contentiousness in assessing costs and benefits 
in environmental, health, and safety regulations comes from traditional cost-benefit analysis devaluing, 
ignoring, or simply missing a number of affective values and emotional impacts, including morally based 
affect in particular.  Affective reactions are likely to be just as important, if not more important, for non-
financial risks than financial risks.  But while m oney provides a common metric for quantifying and 
measuring financial risks,  quantifying and measuring non-financial risks typically lacks a universally 
accepted standardized and unifying metric.  Money arises naturally in discussions evaluating regulating 
financial and s ecurities markets, but not necessarily naturally in discourse analyzing r egulating non-
financial risks, such as environmental risks,
344 health risks,
345 and safety risks.
346  Although there are 
cross-cultural differences in the psychology of money, there are also similarities in how individuals think 
about money across nations.
347   
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CBA provides less (and less accurate) information than EIA because CBA does not account for, 
include, measure, nor quantify emotional impacts.  “Without accurate information on overall economic 
conditions, workers, firms, voters, and policymakers are flying blind – or at least peering through a thick 
fog.”
348  A personal  analogy may  prove helpful.  During my last annual physical examination, my 
physician prescribed walking more to reduce my slightly elevated blood pressure.  She suggested buying 
a pedometer to keep track of how many steps I take daily and to set a long-range target of 10,000 steps 
daily.  I purchased a pedometer and walked more, lost that pedometer, bought another, and lost it.  Both 
lost  pedometers also tracked miles walked and calories burned in addition to steps taken.  There are 
fancier pedometers  that also measure  blood pressure.  One can think of such  more sophisticated 
pedometers as being analogous to EIA, while both of the lost pedometers are analogous to CBA.  It is 
ultimately an empirical question and matter of individual choice w hether such more informative 
pedometers are worth their additional emotional impacts and monetary costs.   
Similarly, EIA provides  more  (and more accurate)  information than  CBA does in terms of 
affective variables and emotional impacts.  B ut,  it  is ultimately an empirical question and matter of 
regulatory and social  choice whether such more affectively  informative  EIA is worth its additional 
affective and monetary costs when compared to CBA.  Despite losing both pedometers and finding one of 
them after buying two replacements, but not always remembering to wear any of them, walking as often 
as possible is now an internalized behavior, even without a pedometer.  Similarly, even though a specific 
regulator or society may decide not to adopt, or to abandon after experimentation with actually engaging 
in  EIA,  thinking more  formally,  quantitatively, and rigorously a bout emotional impacts can become 
internalized to cultures, governments, organizations and regulators.  But, despite my walking more than 
before my last physical, unless I actually utilize a pedometer, I will be unable to measure and quantify my 
progress towards the instrumental goal of 10,000 steps daily.  Unless I purchase another pedometer that 
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measures blood pressure, I will not be able to measure and instantaneously keep track of my progress 
towards the ultimate goal of reducing my blood pressure. 
A final analogy  is that with experience over time,  EIA may come to be analogous to global 
positioning satellite (GPS) navigation systems built into certain automobiles.  Drivers who utilize their 
built-in GPS systems might become so dependent on them that they find themselves lost upon driving 
another car without a built-in GPS.  Of course, there are several hand-held, portable GPS units.  In terms 
of analogies to EIA, this Article has attempted to present both general principles and thoughts about EIA 
that should be portable across different environmental, health, social, and financial regulations in addition 
to specific analysis of conceptual and measurement issues associated with EIA that arise in financial and 
securities regulation.   